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Abstract  
This paper analyses the distributional equality of individual Scottish Government-
administered payments in 2008 under CAP Pillars One (single farm payments) and 
Two (rural development measures) and in total, in terms of economic, social and 
spatial factors.  
The analysis shows that 94% of all payments were paid to claimants in core rural 
areas (94%) while only a few (5%) claimants resided in urban areas or outside of 
Scotland (1%). However, in both Pillars, claims made by urban residents were often 
higher than those made by rural dwellers. The Ordinary Least Squares spatial analysis 
shows  that  the  level  of  payments  was  extremely  dependent  on  the  geographical 
location and natural conditions. Spatial factors describing the economic situation in 
the area of the claimant were significantly related to the level of the CAP amounts 
paid.  Overall,  the  level  of  amounts  paid  was  positively  related  to  the  natural, 
economic and social structures of the area of residence. 
The discussion tackles the question of whether the current system of farm income 
support by decoupled payments should be developed into a poverty payment system.  
 
Keywords: Pillar One, Common Agricultural Policy, Gini-Coefficient, Rural-Urban 
distribution, distributional justice 
JEL-Codes: Q15, R14, R11 
1  Introduction 
This paper offers an exploratory analysis of how equally the Common Agricultural 
Policy  (CAP)  Pillar  One  and  Pillar  Two  payments  in  Scotland  are  distributed. 
Furthermore,  as  the  place  of  residence  of  the  claimants  is  known,  an  analysis  by 
regions and spatial factors is carried out.  
The analysis was stimulated by the widely shared suspicion that a significant part of 
CAP payments is paid to absentee landlords and to more favoured areas in terms of 
nature and economy. Such suspicion is deeply rooted in the fact that landownership in 
Scotland is highly unequally distributed.  One of the most prominent questions in decisions about how to spend public money is 
the question of distributional justice. In politics outside of agriculture, we find that 
there are two different motivations to pay support to individuals:  
  First, to ensure that the poor (and often unemployed) have a certain quality of 
life (avoidance of hunger, a place to live, health insurance, etc.) and 
  second, to invest in the creation of new and/or existing jobs (often done by 
payments to large investors).  
The current CAP system is defined by the Treaty of Rome as targeted at “introducing 
technological progress into agriculture”, thus increase food security, the rural quality 
of life, and the livelihoods of the agricultural community. In the EU12, these targets 
were largely reached by the late 1980s if the analysis is restricted to the agricultural 
sector.  Since  these  times,  although  not  officially  announced,  we  have  seen  a 
transformation of this policy from investment policy into an income support policy. 
The perception that most of the CAP’s targets have not only been reached but often 
over-fulfilled was intensified in the 1890s by mountains of grain, butter, meat and 
other agricultural commodities, as well as by the negative environmental effects of 
intensive and often industrial farming. Additionally, as the CAP’s functioning relied 
on the subsidised export of commodities produced in excess, it became a financial 
burden as well as a problem for Europe’s trade partners in developing as well as 
developed countries.  
This discussion led to several CAP reform steps starting with the MacSharry reform 
in 1992 until the most recent reform proposals by the European Commission (EC) in 
November 2010. Based on the reform steps of the Fischler Reform in 2003, Single 
Farm  payments  (SFP)  are  now  the  main  instrument  of  CAP  Pillar  One.  The 
introduction of the SFP represented a major shift from supporting farm production to 
so-called  decoupling  that  is  linked  to  land  management  under  certain  conditions 
(cross-compliance). For the next reform after 2013, the EC has proposed a number of 
measures to face the “new challenges” of climate change, water management, etc., 
and has written that in the next period the new payments under Pillar One should be 
distributed more equitably than before.  This leads to the question of how equitably distributed is the current SFP support (or 
SFP) in Scotland as a case study.  
 
  2   How equally distributed are CAP payments? 
Kangas 2000 assumes that everyone would agree that justice should be the central 
principle of institutions that are responsible for the distribution of societal resources. 
Justice in redistribution is a matter of finding the right balance between duties and 
entitlements, i.e. the right ratio between benefits and burdens.  
What  splits  the  consensus  is  putting  this  principle  into  practice.  Often,  the  key 
questions are: what should be redistributed (e.g. money, factor ownership, etc.)? To 
whom should it be redistributed (e.g. among every citizen, or only to commuters, to 
rural  dwellers,  the  “poor”,  etc.)?  And  how  much  should  be  distributed  (e.g.  all 
resources equally to everyone, or only tax revenue, etc.)?  
Looking  around  the  world,  we  find  that  all  sorts  of  re-distributional  policies  are 
backed by the argument that this policy will contribute to justice. For example, the 
Scottish  Government  wants  to  create  a  “wealthier  and  fairer,  healthier,  safer  and 
stronger,  smarter  and  greener”  Scotland.  In  essence,  this  strategy  means  that  re-
distributional targets set by the government before 2007 (the date that the Scottish 
National Party entered government) are all revisited. In the political process, we often 
find that with governmental change the answers given to the above three questions are 
changed to a smaller or larger extent depending on the promises made to voters as 
well as in reaction to external challenges faced by new governments. On the other 
hand,  even  if  new  governments  take  a  radical  approach  to  introduce  new  re-
distributional policies, they are often limited by longstanding commitments made by 
prior governments and by the resistance of the administrators that follow their own 
agenda.  In  general,  however,  all  these  political  actors  try  their  best  to  ensure 
distributional justice according to some definition. 
Following Kangas 2003, there are a number of possibilities to guarantee impartial and 
just (re-)distribution in the primitive state (without interference of lobbies and societal 
groups). The best known method – often used with small children - is to follow the 
rule: “Who slices the pie, chooses last”. This rule ensures that, since the one who does the slicing has to choose his/her slice last, everyone will get an equitable share of the 
common  resource.  Especially  in  cases  when  there  is  a  new  (or  newly  defined) 
resource, this method can be used with success and will result in distributive equality. 
However, for most societal issues, such approach is not practical, due to the legal and 
societal  framework,  even  if  by  social  consent  and  common  sense  such  approach 
would be the best. 
In such a situation when the first or second best solution is not applicable, a third or 
even  fourth  best  solution,  in  which  some  get  more  than  others,  might  be  more 
justifiable.  
For example, Baldwin 2005 shows that, for the whole UK for the year 2003/4 e.g. the 
Queen  received  €231,000,  the  Prince  of  Wales  €130,000  and  the  Duke  of 
Marlborough € 296,000 of CAP payments in England. In analysing a full EU data 
set,he found that about 6% of all farmers in the EU15 got 53% of all CAP payments, 
and that 13% got 71%.  
Already Brown 1990 shows for different farm types that the factor owners enjoy the 
biggest benefits of agricultural policy support. He showed that the CAP system of 
intervention prices etc. in the late 1980s gave the largest amount of money to those 
with  the  larger  farms,  while  smaller  farms  benefitted  less  than  proportionally.  In 
essence, although the CAP was reformed several times between then and today, this 
finding did not change.  
The root causes for the unequal distribution of CAP payments across farms that are 
described sporadically in the literature.  
Keeney  2000  analysed  the  distributional  impact  of  direct  payments  on  Irish  farm 
incomes  for  the  period  between  1992  and  1996.  She  concluded  that  the  Gini 
coefficient as a measure of distribution of the direct payments between 1992 and 1996 
fell from 0.6277 to 0.5475, meaning that the equality of payments during this period 
increased considerably. However, this development in Irish farming was accompanied 
by a large dependency of small farms on subsidies to achieve a positive income. She 
also found that 30% of all farms in Ireland were responsible for 98% of all market-
based farming incomes, leaving just 2% for the rest mostly small farms. She states: 
“market income now contributes less to total income across the majority of farms than ever before, but remains the single largest influence deciding the income ranking of a 
farm” (Keeney 2000, 263). This led her to the conclusion that the CAP payments 
were not very well targeted and therefore are unequally distributed.  
Allanson 2006 described the redistributive effect of the CAP in 1999/2000 on Scottish 
farm incomes. He showed that about two-thirds of all CAP payments reached the 
farm household, while the rest went to the factor owners (e.g. land owners, factor 
suppliers,  etc.).  He  concluded  that  the  then-existing  system  was  not  able  to  re-
distribute income to those actually most in need of it, but indeed supported the well-
off (Allanson 2003, 2006). 
Schmid et al. 2006 analysed how equally CAP payments were distributed in a number 
of member states, based on FADN data. In their analysis of data from 2001, they 
found  that  the  distribution  of  the  Pillar  One  payments  across  European  countries 
(EU14 excluding Greece due to the non-availability of data) varies considerably. The 
concentration ratio (Gini coefficient) shows that there are two types of member states: 
Portugal, the UK, Spain, Italy and Germany, which have high levels of concentration 
(about 0.7 or higher) and a second group of countries in which the CAP payments are 
a  little  more  equally  paid  out.  This  second  group  consists  of  Belgium,  Denmark, 
France, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden with a CR 
of between 0.49 and 0.64. They therefore endorse the “rule” that 20% of all farmers 
get 80% of the payments. Regarding the impact of CAP payments on farm household 
incomes, they project that the current CAP system of paying SFPs would increase 
inequality to a large extent in the sample of Austrian FADN farms. 
For Hungarian agriculture, Hubbard et al. 2007 show that the distribution of CAP 
payments has been unequal, with Gini coefficients over 0.7 for FADN data between 
2002 and 2005, and less than 20% of the Hungarian farmers getting about 80% of all 
subsidies. During the process of Hungarian accession, the inequality of distribution 
went down slightly from 0.75 in 2002 to 0.72 in 2005. The farm group that got the 
highest share of agricultural subsidies in 2005 were the economically organised large 
mixed farms that got about 20% of all subsidies, followed by large arable farms and 
the  large  arable  privately  organised  farms  with  14%  and.  12%  respectively.  The 
groups that got the smallest share of subsidies were the permanent and horticultural 
farms  followed  by  pig  and  poultry  farms.  Our  conclusion  from  this  is  that landownership increases the amount of subsidies being paid to the individual farm or 
landowner  as  the  labour-intensive  production  systems  (pigs,  poultry,  cattle)  profit 
from the current payment system less than other organizations.  
Hence, with hardly any exception known to the author, the bulk of studies conclude 
that the current instruments of the CAP do not prevent a substantial part of the farm 
community from being the poorest citizens of the EU member states. At the same 
time, direct payments to high-income farm units clearly enlarge the considerable 
income inequalities in the sector regardless of the wealth that asset ownership might 
present for the farmers in case of selling their farms. 
Dax  2005  has  shifted  the  focus  of  distributional  justice  to  the  spatial  level  of 
distribution of CAP payments across Europe in order to enhance the importance of the 
rural development Pillar Two. He finds that Pillar One expenditures do not support 
territorial cohesion, since the highest levels of CAP payments are correlated with the 
most fertile areas in Europe. According to the maps presented in his article, the same 
is true for Pillar Two expenditures to some extent. With the latest reform making a 
small shift from the old-style area-based payments in Pillar Two towards a better 
targeted remuneration of environmental goods and services as well as a stronger focus 
on rural development measures, he found some changes over time. However, overall 
he finds that territorial (or social) cohesion was still not a favoured target of the CAP 
until recently. 
Such territorial approach has also been advocated and used by a number of studies 
that have dealt with questions related to the environment and especially the effect of 
agri-environmental schemes on the provision of public goods and services (e.g. EEA 
2009, Elbersen et al. 2009, Farmer n.d., Feinerman & Komen 2003.) These studies all 
have in common that they try to make the link between environmental quality and the 
payments  that  have  been  made  under  the  current  Pillar  Two  Axis  Two  schemes, 
notwithstanding whether these payments reach the addressed area or not.  
Such territorial approaches are often related to the use of GIS or similar software. For 
example, the ESPON project has provided a number of interesting features describing 
where the CAP expenses are spent locally.  To the knowledge of the author, there is no analysis of the effect of location on 
individual CAP payment claims or on distributional justice. 
  3  CAP payments in Scotland 2008 – description and framework 
In 2007, the European Commission (see Article 44a of Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1290/2005 as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1437/2007 and Commission 
Regulation (EC) No. 259/2008) decided that the member states had to publish the 
names,  addresses  and  amounts  claimed  under  CAP  support  for  all  payment 
recipients
1. In each Member state, webpages were set up on which the general public 
could inspect how much money each claimant of CAP support got in the preceding 
year.  In  the  case  of  the  UK,  the  Department  published  this  information  for  the 
Environment,  Food  and  Agriculture  (DEFRA)  as  well  as  by  the  devolved 
administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.  
Initially,  this  data  gave  the  following  information  for  calendar  year  2008:  name 
(company, family partnership or a natural person), place of residence of the claimant, 
postcode area, amounts claimed under Pillar One, Pillar Two and in total. Later on in 
the  year  2008/9,  this  presentation  was  altered  to  one  in  which  more  detailed 
information was given, ordered by area in which the claim was made as well as more 
specific information about claims under Pillar Two, e.g. Less Favoured Area (LFAS, 
agri-environmental, and other schemes.  
For this paper, the first data base has been used, processed and analysed and amended 
by the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation information and information about the 
rurality of the place of residence of the claimants (see additional information in the 
annex). 
Such data can be used for a number of analyses about the spatial distribution of CAP 
payments related to the place of residence of the claimants. Furthermore, by specific 
calculation  this  allows  for  the  analysis  of  distributional  and  spatial  justice  of  the 
claims. 
                                                 
1 Recently, however, the publication of the data used in this paper was made invalid by a 
ruling of the European Court at the 9 November 2010 in Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09. The CAP claimant’s data was reclassified on the basis of the rural-urban classification 
for 2007/8 provided by the Scottish Government. This index provides information 
about how rural a specific postcode location is. These postcodes (about 120,000 in 
Scotland) consist of about five and up to eight characters, in two parts.  
The first parts of the postcode (e.g. OX17), were linked to the longitude and latitude 
provided by free map tools (Free Map tools 2010), processed in excel and linked to 
the six-fold rural-urban classification of 2008 (Scottish Government 2008).  
The  six-fold  rural-urban  classification  describes  rurality  based  on  travel  times  to 
urban  centres.  Another  possible  classification  would  have  been  the  rurality  index 
provided  by  the  OECD  (e.g.  OECD  2008);  however,  this  index  uses  a  territorial 
approach rather than providing information about the degree of rurality based on point 
information such as the postcodes.  
The  categories  ‘accessible  rural’  and  ‘remote  rural’  (five  and  six  if  available) 
constitute the rural parts of Scotland, while categories one and two constitute the 
urban parts of Scotland. The intermediate categories three and four are understood as 
the “urban fringe” (an area in which rural and urban characteristics overlap; Abler 
2001). 
The following table describes the factors that were responsible for the classification of 
the postcode areas to different rurality categories.  




1  Large Urban Areas Settlements of over 125,000 people; 
2  Other Urban Areas Settlements of 10,000 to 125,000 people. 
3  Accessible Small Towns Settlements of between 3,000 and 10,000 people and within 30 
minutes drive of a settlement of 10, 000 or more 
4  Settlements of between 3,000 and 10,000 people and with a drive time of over 30 minutes 
to a settlement of 10,000 or more. 
5  Settlements of less than 3,000 people and within 30 minutes drive of a settlement of 
10,000 or more. 
6  Settlements of less than 3,000 people and with a drive time of six-fold: over 30 minutes to 
a settlement of 10,000 or more. 
Source: Scottish Government 2008 
 This data was linked to each claimant’s postcode area and in a final step the SIMD 
and economic information was added for each postcode area. 
This  SIMD  data  measures  a  number  of  indicators  of  deprivation,  and  so  can  be 
understood as quality of life indicators. 
The  data  used  to  analyse  the  locational  impact  on  the  amount  paid  to  individual 
farmers.  The  locational  information  of  the  claimants  has  been  classified  with  the 
available information about the local council area (LCAs) of Scotland:  
Aberdeen  City,  Aberdeenshire,  Angus,  Argyll  &  Bute,  Dumfries  &  Galloway, 
Dundee City, East Ayrshire, East Lothian, East Renfrewshire, Edinburgh, City, Eilean 
Siar, Fife, Glasgow City, Highland, Inverclyde, Midlothian, Moray, North Ayrshire, 
North Lanarkshire, Orkney Island, Perth & Kinross, Renfrewshire, Scottish Borders, 
Shetland Islands, South Ayrshire, South Lanarkshire, Stirling, West Dunbarton, West 
Lothian  
In a final step the data was amended by a number of different information that either 
originated from the SIMD or from official estimates of economic performance of 
these areas.  
Total Population 2007, Number of Income Deprived People 2009, Number dependent 
on  Tax  Credits  2009,  Number  of  Employment  Deprived  2009,  Working  Age 
Population 2007 (men 16-64, women 16-59), Pupil Performance on SQA at Stage 4 
(SQA,2005/6-2007/8),  School  Pupil  Absences  (Scottish  Government,  2005/6  - 
2007/8), Drive Time to GP 2009 (mins), Drive Time to Petrol Station 2009 (mins), 
Drive Time to Post Office 2009 (mins), Drive Time to Primary School 2009 (mins), 
Drive Time to Secondary School 2009 (mins), Drive Time to shopping facilities 2009 
(mins), Public Transport Travel Time to GP 2009 (mins), Public Transport Travel 
Time to Post Office 2009 (mins), Public Transport Travel Time to shopping facilities 
2009 (mins), SIMD Crimes per 10,000 total population, Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing GVAs at current basic prices (£ million), GVA at current basic prices in £ 
million  of  the  production  sector,  Construction  GVAs  at  current  basic  prices  in  £ 
million, Distribution, transport and communication GVAs at current basic prices in £ 
million, Business services and finance GVAs at current basic prices in £ million, 
Public  administration,  education,  health  and  other  services  GVAs  at  current  basic prices in £ million, Total GVA in £ million GVAs at current basic prices in £ million, 
and GVA per head of population at current basic prices.  
Three different analyses have been carried out.  
  A frequency analysis of the data classified to Local Council areas and the 
“rurality” of the postcode area of the claimants (SG, 2008). 
  The  calculation  of  the  Gini  coefficient  as  a  conclusive  measure  of  the 
redistributional equity of the CAP payments under a) Pillar One, b) Pillar Two 
and c) in total. 
  An  OLS  estimation  of  the  influence  of  available  spatial  and  economic 
information (SIMD, 2009) on the amounts paid to the claimants. 
 
  4  Scotland – some key figures 
Scotland has a population of about 5.2 million. The most important economic sectors 
are business and financial services with a share of 29% in Gross Value Added (GVA) 
of £101,598 million in 2008, followed by public administration and services with 
26%,  distribution,  transportation  and  communications  with  20%,  industry 
(production) with 17%, construction with 7% and agriculture, forestry and fishing 
with 1%. While all other industries provided labour roughly equal to their GVA share, 
the employment share in agriculture, forestry and fishing was roughly double that of 
its GVA with 2%.  
GVA per head of population in 2008 across Scotland was very high in Edinburgh 
(£34,000), Glasgow (£29,000) and Aberdeen (£28,000). The local council areas with 
the lowest GVA per head were East and North Ayrshire (£12,000), Dunbartonshire 
and Helenburgh & Lomond (£12,000), Scottish Borders (£13,000), the Western Isles 
(£13000) and the Highlands of Scotland (£14,000). In general the more remote areas 
(seen  from  the  three  above  mentioned  Large  Urban  areas  (LUA)  Aberdeen, 
Edinburgh and Glasgow) have a GVA per head that is lower than the average of 
roughly £20,000 a year, while areas that are nearer to the LUA have higher average 
GVA per head.  The  main  population  centres  can  be  found  mainly  in  the  South  (Glasgow  and 
Edinburgh) and in the North-East (Aberdeen). However, also these figures seem to 
indicate that urban centres are better off, according to the Scottish Index of Multiple 
Deprivation  (SIMD)  the  so-called  pockets  of  “deprivation”  can  be  found  equally 
spread across the country. Such deprivation in terms of the economic situation is often 
found at places were an historical industry is in decline or has finished this process in 
the  last  ten  to  twenty  years  (e.g.  fishing  industries  across  the  coastline  with 
Fraserburgh, Wick, Lochinver or Ullapool, wood processing in Fort Williams, Ship 
industry in Glasgow at the Clyde, etc.). Regarding other key figures about the rural-
urban split in Scotland, the SIMD shows that in general people in rural areas have a 
longer life expectancy than urban dwellers also emergency health care has a longer 
reaction time, school kids in general have better A levels achieved and crime rates are 
lower in rural areas than in urban areas.  
Unemployment is often higher in rural areas than in the urban centres or on the urban 
fringe. Transport mobility and access to public services is due to the large distances 
and  often  mountainous  areas  one  of  the  core  problems  in  rural  Scotland  and  this 
problem is even more proliferated on the most important isles (Orkney, Shetland and 
Western Isles).  
In 2008 the estimated net value added at factor cost of Scottish agriculture was £1052 
million. Of this roughly 50% (£578 million) came from payments and subsidies (e.g. 
Single  Farm  Payments,  Less-Favoured  Areas  Support  Scheme,  Land  Management 
Contract Menu Scheme, Set Aside Payments, Environmentally Sensitive Areas and 
other agri-environmental Schemes (most of them paid by Pillar Two)).  
Land use in Scotland in broad categories can be characterised as being specialised in 
the North and Northwest on extensive sheep and cattle husbandry. In the South and 
Northeast we find pigs and some dairy cows as well. Across Scotland there are about 
up to 15% area that is woodlands - some in forests some in farm woodlands -and 
wherever the natural conditions fit, cereal farming with wheat, barley and other crops 
on about 22,000 ha annually.  
Regarding the structure of farms we find that there is a duality in Scottish Farming. 
On the one hand we find a majority of small (often part time) farming e.g. in the 
Highlands  and  Islands  with  the  crofting  system,  on  the  other  hand  we  find  large estates  (in  the  Highlands  and  Islands  often  as  sporting  estates)  or  if  the  natural 
conditions fit also large scale cereal farms.  
There were about 26,000 owner occupiers and about 18,000 spouses that work on a 
farm in Scotland in 2008, these had about 20,000 hired staff and about 6000 casual 
staff. The total agricultural area of Scotland is about 5.6 million hectares of which 
about 10% were used for crops, fallow or set-aside, about 32% for grassland (under 5 
years since sowing) and the rest was rough grazing and farm woodlands. Husbandry 
in Scotland is basically concentrated on sheep farming with a herd of 7.1 million 
animals, followed by cattle with 1.8 million heads, about 0.4 million pigs and about 
14 million poultry.  
Overall the figures provided by the Scottish Government over the last ten years reveal 
that agriculture is a business on decline in terms of land and labour use while capital 
use is intensified. 
A speciality of Scotland is that while in most parts of Western Europe landownership 
has  been  distributed  to  the  land  users  in  the  early  19
th  century,  landownership  in 
Scotland  staid  at  a  level  that  is  often  described  as  feudal.  An  analysis  of  the 
landownership in Scotland done by Wightman 1996 shows that 1630 landholdings 
own 8,901,290 acres (about 3.6 million hectares or 45% of the surface of Scotland).  
This unequal distribution of landownership affects the distribution of CAP payments 
since the latest reform has decoupled payments from production and introduced a 
system in which payments are linked to land-use and -ownership. This system of 
Single farm payments (SFP) is linked to 19 regulations (cross compliance) and the 
good agricultural and environmental conditions (GAEC) which all in essence mean 
that farmers have to respond to the already existing legal framework and – if they do 
– will get an annually often farm based payment per ha. Basically therefore we find 
an income support without too strict regulations. 
Subsidies and payments have a significant influence on the annual profit of Scottish 
farmers.  Depending  on  the  type  of  farm,  the  dependency  of  Total  Income  from 
Farming  (TIFF)  on  subsidies  is  between  120%  and  about  50%.  In  general,  crop-
producing farms are less dependent of subsidies than the less favoured area based extensive sheep farms that often realise an annual loss (or negative net farm income) 
even including the SFP.  
For sheep farmers and extensive cattle farmers, the existing payments no longer 
supports technological progress or aims at a more efficient farm organisation or viable 
under market conditions but covers deficits that are caused by being in production.   
  4  Results 
  4.1  Frequency analysis 
In  2008,  £546  million  was  paid  to  22,429  claimants  of  total  CAP  payments  in 
Scotland; £427 million to 19,905 claimants under Pillar One, and £119 million to 
18,228  claimants  under  Pillar  Two.  Claims  per  claimant  ranged  from  £1.36  to 
£844,000 under Pillar One, and from £0.28 up to £272,000 under Pillar Two.  
The  average  claim  per  claimant  under  Pillar  One  was  £21,467,  under  Pillar  Two 
£6,551 and in total £24,374
2. As table two shows the highest average claims are made 
in accessible small towns followed by accessible rural areas and the lowest average 
claims are made in the remote rural areas.  
                                                 
2 The average figures do not add up, as a number of claimants did not claim under both 
Pillars.  
Table 2 Average payments per claimant in 2008 by Pillar and region 
  Pillar One  Pillar Two  TOTAL CAP 
Large Urban Area  £27,303.66  £7,861.26  £29,145.75 
Other Urban area  £23,932.14  £5,880.35  £24,879.06 
Accessible Small Towns  £30,079.38  £6,979.33  £33,060.44 
Remote Small Towns  £25,424.48  £7,062.59  £28,638.12 
Accessible Rural  £29,230.73  £6,743.99  £31,334.02 
Remote Rural  £14,385.98  £6,258.73  £18,385.18 
Outside Scotland  £21,073.83  £8,122.93  £18,550.60 
Total  £21,466.09  £6,551.90  £24,374.86 
 
  4.2.  Spatial distribution of place of residence in 2008 (see Figure 1) 
We found that 434 claimants lived in large urban areas (e.g. Glasgow, Edinburgh, 
Aberdeen), 785 claimants in other urban areas (often the outskirts of these cities), 
3200 in accessible small towns, 4026 in remote small towns (e.g. Inverness, Melrose, 
St. Andrews, Perth, Dundee, Dumfries), 5628 in accessible rural areas (e.g. Fife, the 
Borders), 7890 in remote rural areas (e.g. the Western and Northern Ilses, Caithness, 
Sutherland, Ross and Cromarty, Inverness-shire).  
In adding up some of the categories into the broader rural urban categories we found 
the following percentages. The majority (about 85%) of the claimants in Scotland live 
in  rural  areas.  About  5%  of  the  claimants  reside  in  large  urban  areas.  If  only 
accessible rural and remote areas are counted as rural, we find that under Pillar One 
88%, under Pillar Two 88% and in total 86% of the claims are made to rural regions. 
Further analysis shows that these claimants get 84% under Pillar one, 86% under 
Pillar two and in total 85% of all Scottish governments governed CAP payments. 
Therefore, 14% to 16% of CAP payments are paid to areas that are either urban or 
outside of Scotland.  
483 claimants lived outside Scotland. Of these, most the bulk part lived in the English 
Borders (e.g. in Berwick upon Tweed), some in Northern Ireland, central London or 
elsewhere in the UK, and a few (less than 30) abroad (e.g. Brussels, Copenhagen, 
Australia, Hong Kong).  
The share of the total CAP expenses of claimants residing outside Scotland was as 
1.63%  of  total  expenditure,  under  Pillar  One  as  1.36%  and  2.58%  in  Pillar  Two 
expenses.  The  amounts  of  the  Scottish  CAP  expenses  spent  on  residents  outside Scotland in 2008 were £5.582.336 under Pillar One, £3.076.438 under Pillar Two, and 
£8.904.775 in total. 
Figure 1 Spatial distribution of claimants in the UK  
 
Source: Scottish Government and own calculations 
Property of the borderline shapefile: Crown Estate and Scottish Government 
 
Table 3 Spatial distribution of Scottish Governments CAP payment claimants in 2008 in percent 
  Total  Pillar 1  Pillar 2 
Large Urban Area  2,14%  2,04%  2,49% 
Other Urban area  3,37%  3,57%  2,67% 
Accessible Small Towns  18,00%  19,07%  14,17% 
Remote Small Towns  21,08%  21,99%  17,84% 
Accessible Rural  31,41%  32,92%  26,03% 
Remote Rural  22,36%  19,04%  34,23% 
Outside Scotland  1,63%  1,36%  2,58% 
 
 The  analysis  reveals  that  the  expenditure  that  does  not  reach  in  the  first  place 
claimants residing in rural (agricultural areas) is for the total 7.14%, for Pillar One 
6.98% and for the Pillar Two expenditure 7.73%. About 92% of all expenditure of the 
Scottish government is therefore paid to claimants in rural areas.  
However, Table 4 shows that the mean claim in remote rural areas is considerably 
lower than the average claim made in Scotland. Such claims only reach about 64% in 
total (£15.493 annually), under Pillar One even only 54% and under Pillar Two at last 
about 88% of the national mean claim. Claimants outside of Scotland get in total less 
than the average claim, but their Pillar Two claims under are slightly higher than the 
national average claim. This result for a Pillar that is targeted at supporting rural 
development in Scotland is surprising. 
Table 4 Average claims by area by fund and in average in Scotland 2008 
  Total  Pillar One  Pillar Two 
Large Urban Area  111%  115%  153% 
Other Urban area  96%  103%  87% 
Accessible Small Towns  126%  133%  106% 
Remote Small Towns  117%  122%  105% 
Accesible Rural  125%  129%  109% 
Remote Rural  64%  54%  88% 
Outside Scotland  78%  101%  127% 
Average claim  £24.375  £21.466  £6.552 
 
 
  4.3  Distribution of claims across Scotland in 2008 
In order to get a complete picture of the distribution of claims across Scotland similar 
to  the  classification  of  the  Scottish  Government
3,  the  data  was  re-classified  into 
several classes (e.g. claims under £1,000; between £1,000 and £2,000, etc.) For each 
class,  the  average  claim  and  the  sum  was  calculated  so  to  see  how  equally  the 
payments are paid and in order to build a Lorenz curve (Figure 2). 
 
 
                                                 
3 The Scottish Government presents annually information about how much claims are made 
by claimants classified by the amount of the claim being made. Eg. that under 5% of the 
claimants claim amounts of more than £500,000 annually.  
Figure 2 Lorenz curve of CAP Total payments in Scotland differentiated by individual claimant 
 
Table 5 distribution of CAP payments by deciles of claimants and percentage of total amount 
claimed 
  Pillar One  Pillar Two  Total 
  N = 19905  N= 18229  N = 22429 
Total in £   £427.282.497, 33    £119.421.165, 15    £546.703.663, 84  
1st decile  0, 14%  0, 47%  0, 17% 
2nd decile  0, 38%  0, 74%  0, 44% 
3rd decile  0, 85%  1, 39%  0, 91% 
4th decile  1, 75%  2, 41%  1, 74% 
5th decile  3, 36%  3, 87%  3, 17% 
6th decile  5, 81%  5, 54%  5, 42% 
7th decile  9, 10%  8, 12%  8, 76% 
8th decile  13, 43%  12, 01%  13, 41% 
9th decile  20, 22%  18, 95%  20, 47% 
10th decile  44, 96%  46, 50%  45, 51% 
 
As a rule of thumb, about 30% of all claimants in Scotland claim of the total CAP 
expenses about 79%, while the rest of the claimants with 70% (often small farmers, 
crofters or part-time and hobby farmers) got about 21% of all expenses of the SG. 
This distribution is true for Pillar One and Pillar Two expenses. Given that a) any 
CAP payment is related to landownership and b) land property is highly unequally 
distributed in Scotland, such result was expected.  
Furthermore this separation into ten groups allows differentiating the groups by the 
mean  claim  the  groups  have  made.  These  average  claims  can  be  found  in  the following table. In the first six deciles the average claimed amount doubles each time 
as it is shown under the column Pillar One and under total. 
It can be seen that the average claim is about £21.000 a year under Pillar One, about 
£6.000 under Pillar Two and the combination of the both claims due to the higher 
number of claimants is just about £24.000. Given that in Scotland in 2008 the poverty 
pay was between £12 and £13.000 annually and that the annual median salary was 
about £28.000, the average claim is a sound social payment. 
 
Table 6 Average claims by decile in £ in 2008 
  Pillar 1  Pillar 2  Total 
10%   £298, 86    £309, 05    £408, 86  
20%   £823, 74    £486, 29    £1.076, 49  
30%   £1.818, 39    £910, 90    £2.213, 62  
40%   £3.761, 72    £1.578, 83    £4.240, 67  
50%   £7.215, 93    £2.539, 44    £7.733, 14  
60%   £12.469, 47    £3.628, 13    £13.219, 93  
70%   £19.529, 57    £5.321, 86    £21.365, 53  
80%   £28.843, 24    £7.874, 78    £32.704, 69  
90%   £43.424, 39    £12.418, 88    £49.908, 44  
100%   £96.287, 57    £30.326, 04    £110.531, 34  
Average    £21.466, 09    £6.551, 16    £24.374, 86  
 
 
  4.4.  Gini-coefficient 
The gini-coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion. It measures the inequality of 
a  distribution,  a  value  of  0  expressing  total  equality  and  a  value  of  1  maximal 
inequality (Breiman et al. 1984). In such it often is used in economics to describe the 
distribution of incomes, wealth or like in this case of payments made to individuals.  
There are a number of applications being made gini-coefficients of which the most 
famous one can be found in the measures of poverty by the World Bank (Worldbank 
n.d.).  In  some  cases  the  gini-coefficient  is  also  used  to  analyse  the  impact  that 
remittances have on household welfare in Latin America (e.g. Acosta et al. 2008).  
In  agricultural  economic  literature  we  find  for  example  that  Vollrath  2007  has 
employed  a  gini-coefficient  to  assess  the  impact  that  the  land  ownership  has  on 
technical  efficiency  of  farming.  Keeney  2009  has  analysed  with  this  method  the transfer  and  distributional  efficiency  of  farm  support  policies  on  farm  household 
income.  
We  have  calculated  the  gini-coefficients  (Dg)  for  Scotland  in  2008.  The  gini-
coefficient is calculated by the following formula:  
 (Equation 1) 
with h
i is the fraction of (in this case) payments that the individual claimant got from 
the  total  amount  of  payments  made  in  2008.  The  individual  claims  in  order  to 




n. n is the number of each case and here the maximum number was 
22,429. For the calculations of the gini-coefficients of Pillar One the maximum n was 
19,905 and for Pillar Two it was 18,229. 
We found that all CAP payments are unequally distributed across Scotland. The total 
payments had a gini-coefficient of 0.649, the Pillar One payments of 0.685 and the 
Pillar Two payments showed a gini-coefficient of 0.7. Therefore Pillar One payments 
are more equally distributed Pillar Two payments. So in comparison it seems that the 
single farm payments are able to contribute more to distributional justice than the 
Pillar Two payments. Furthermore even in the regions the equality was not given but 
in each location often a highly unequal distribution of the payments (reflecting the 
unequal landownership in Scotland) was present. 
The gini-coefficients for the CAP payments were as follows:  
Table 7 Gini-Coefficients of CAP payments in Scotland 2008 
  Pillar One  Pillar Two  total 
Large Urban Area  0.63  0.72  0.59 
Other Urban area  0.66  0.75  0.62 
Accessible Small Towns  0.59  0.71  0.58 
Remote Small Towns  0.67  0.63  0.63 
Accessible Rural  0.61  0.71  0.59 
Remote Rural  0.73  0.69  0.69 
Outside Scotland  0.86  0.76  0.76 
Total  0.69  0.70  0.65 
 
 
As the figures show Pillar One payments are marked by a high inequality as are the 
Pillar Two as in both cases the values are above 0.5. In total however due to the fact that there is a higher number of claimants this inequality is lower than in the specific 
pillars. Inequality of claims across the areas is higher outside of Scotland than it is 
inside of Scotland. In such the second highest inequality is found in rural remote areas 
under Pillar One. Even under Pillar Two inequalities are present also it would have 
been expected that in a pillar that explicitly is targeted at rural development and the 
support of sustainability this distribution would have been more equal. Overall with a 
minimum gini-coefficient of 0.58 in accessible small towns equality of payments is 
not given to a large extent. 
 
  4.5.  Influence of spatial factors on the individual claims in 2008 
In order to test the influence of spatial, economic and social factors on the claims 
made, an exploratory ordinary least squares regression analysis was undertaken.  
This was done with PASW 18. The dependent variable was the amount of claim in £ 
being made under Pillar One and Pillar Two resp. by the individual claimants in 2008.  
4.5.1   Pillar One 
The results reveal that there is a positive (but not statistically significant) relation 
between the rurality index (where 1 stands for urban centre and 6 for rural remote 
area) and individual claims. The spatial location has a significant relation to the place 
of residence of the claimants and the amount claimed. Regarding the latitude it can be 
said  that  the  further  south  a  claimant  lives  the  higher  the  amount  is  s/he  claims. 
Furthermore  the  further  East  a  claimant,  the  more  is  claimed.  This  result  is  in 
accordance with the spatial distribution of the more fertile areas in the South and East 
while the North and Western parts of Scotland have more unfavourable production 
conditions.  
Regarding the transport mobility, we find that the longer the car drive times to any 
service point (e.g. GP, shops, post office) are the higher are the CAP claims. On the 
other hand, it is also shown that the shorter the public transport travel times, the 
higher the claims.  
There is a significant negative relation between the dependent variable and the total 
population in the LCA. This means that claimants residing in less populated areas (i.e. 
rural areas) get more SFP than residents of higher populated areas. The other social 
indicators are not significant but there is a hint in this data that a higher share of the working  age  population  in  the  total  population  decreases  the  payments,  a  higher 
unemployment leads to a lower amount and that more tax credit claimants in the 
surrounding area increase the amount paid under Pillar One.  
Regarding the economic key figures of the areas we find that the most important key 
figures are the share that agriculture, industry and the transportation sector have of 
total regional GVA. In all cases, this means with a significant relation that the lower 
this share is, the higher the amount of money claimed is. Regarding the GVA per head 
in the areas we find a (again not significant) positive correlation that indicates: the 
better the economic situation of the adjacent area the higher the claim is. 
Table 8 OLS estimation of influence of locational factors on amount of individual claims  
Dependent individual Pillar One claim 
in 2008  B  Std. Error  Beta  t  Sig. 
Constant  397819  36282    10.97  0.000 
Six-fold code 2008  461  287  0.02  1.60  0.109 
Latitude  -5665  616  -0.22  -9.20  0.000 
Longitude  5807  394  0.25  14.72  0.000 
Drive time car to services  136  588  0.01  0.23  0.817 
Drive time public transport to services  -349  294  -0.08  -1.19  0.235 
Total population in heads   -0,0150  0,0060  -0.04  -2.58  0.010 
Share of working age pop.  -36255  50218  -0.02  -0.72  0.470 
Employment deprived people ratio  93963  344313  0.04  0.27  0.785 
Income deprived ratio  -178800  159992  -0.15  -1.12  0.264 
Tax credit claimants ratio  896189  180657  0.12  4.96  0.000 
Agriculture share of total regional 
GVA   -63749  37203  -0.05  -1.71  0.087 
Production share of total regional 
GVA   -32902  15804  -0.05  -2.08  0.037 
Construction share of total regional 
GVA  -34731  40546  -0.02  -0.86  0.392 
Transport share of total regional GVA  -26207  13844  -0.03  -1.89  0.058 
Public administration share of total 
regional GVA  28543  23738  0.04  1.20  0.229 
GVA per head in £   0.056  0.279  0.01  0.20  0.841 
R  R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square     
0.334a  0.111  0.111       
Source: Own calculations 
 
Overall, the OLS regression analysis shows that the higher claims are made where:   the place of residence is more eastern, 
  the place of residence is more southern, 
  the population of the Council area is lower,  
  the number of people on tax credit is higher,  
  the share of agriculture, industry and transportation is the lower,  
the higher is the claim being made by the residents.  
As the beta coefficients show, the most important factors are the spatial location 
rather than the socio-economic ones. Therefore the claims being made under Pillar 
One can be said to be in general dependent on the favourable agricultural conditions 
in southern and eastern Scotland. 
4.5.2  Pillar Two 
For the Pillar Two claims, which are largely LFA and agri-environmental payments 
and are should be paid in rural or rural remote areas, we found the following relations.  
We find that the more rural an area is the higher is the individual claim. Latitude as 
well as longitude are highly significant and show that the more western and the more 
southern a claimant resides the higher the claim is s/he gets. While the latitudinal 
result was expected, the longitudinal result was surprising. As already been measured 
with the rurality classification we find also a significant influence of the 
transportation times. While car transport has a positive influence (e.g. the longer the 
time is to the central place, the higher is the amount claimed), the opposite is true for 
the public transportation services.  
Regarding the social indicators we found that the total population size of the residents 
areas has a negative impact, e.g. the higher it is, the lower is the claim. As this is no 
significant relation the following indicators give a clearer picture as the share of the 
working population is as significant as is the share of the unemployed, the income 
deprived and the share of the tax credit claimants of the total population. The result 
can be understood as that the higher the share of the working population as well as the 
share of the income deprived is the higher are also the claims being made. The 
opposite is true for the share of the unemployed and the tax credit dependent people, here the lower this share is of the total population the higher is the claim being made 
in Pillar Two.  
Again significantly related to the claimed amounts are the economic indicators. The 
calculations shows that the following factors have a negative impact on the amounts 
claimed: the share of agriculture, industry, construction and public administration as 
well as the absolute extent of the GVA per head. This means that the lower the GVA 
per head is, the higher the claim is. On the other hand there is a positive influence of 
transportation sectors regional importance, meaning that the higher this importance is 





Coefficients   
Pillar Two  B  Std. Error  Beta  T  Sig. 
Constant  80160  13313    6.021  0.000 
Six-fold code 2008  624  106  0.070  5.909  0.000 
Latitude  -2186  218  -0.273  -10.020  0.000 
Longitude  1279  140  0.173  9.168  0.000 
Drive time car to services  990  210  0.277  4.710  0.000 
Drive time public transport to services 
-276  106  -0.203  -2.608  0.009 
Total population in heads   -0,003  0,002  -0.028  -1.471  0.141 
Share of working age pop.  145065  18483  0.240  7.848  0.000 
Employment deprived people ratio 
-518700  127134  -0.605  -4.080  0.000 
Income deprived ratio  219320  58789  0.546  3.731  0.000 
Tax credit claimants ratio  -143400  65484  -0.059  -2.191  0.028 
Agriculture share of total regional 
GVA   -40822  13402  -0.100  -3.046  0.002 
Production share of total regional 
GVA   -17255  5771  -0.072  -2.990  0.003 
Construction share of total regional 
GVA  -48803  14674  -0.076  -3.326  0.001 
Transport share of total regional GVA 
18945  5068  0.065  3.738  0.000 
Public administration share of total 
regional GVA  -42706  8761  -0.186  -4.875  0.000 
GVA per head in £   -0.693  0.102  -0.304  -6.797  0.000 
R  R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate   
0.192  0.037  0.036  10981.347     
 
Overall the calculations show that the most important factor are  
  the spatial location followed by  
  the social factors presented,    while economic factors (e.g. GVA per head, etc.) have only minor influence as 
the beta-coefficients show.  
In comparison to the factors that influence the Pillar One payments shows that rural 
development  are  more  targeted  to  the  areas  in  which  rural  development  policy  is 
needed to assist people and regions.  
  6.   Discussion & conclusion 
The CAP claims made in Scotland in 2008 were individually as well as spatially 
unequally distributed. Insofar as the current payments per ha are based on fertility of 
the  land,  this  is  not  an  unexpected  result.  In  average  the  current  main  payment 
provides a sound income for Scottish farmers differentiated by area as well as by 
claimants.  
Secondly, a small but considerable amount of money is paid to claimants that live in 
urban  areas  or  even  outside  of  Scotland.  The  suspicion  here  is  that  the  current 
decoupled Pillar One payment system is much more coupled to landownership than 
before (Breustedt & Habermann 2011).  
This is not in accordance with the common expectation that CAP should be a policy 
targeted  at  agricultural  areas  or  at  least  the  farming  communities.  It  can  not  be 
expected that urban or non-domestically resident claimants contribute much to the 
prosperity  of  rural  areas.  Therefore,  a  new  rule  would  be  needed  that  prohibit 
spending claims on residents that live abroad. Furthermore, in the specific case of 
Scotland, there should be a more thorough inquiry into whether the claimants residing 
in core centres of urban areas in fact spent most of the claimed money on their farm 
e.g. for local labour, local rural factors, etc. The obvious suspicion in such cases is 
that absentee farm occupiers spend the claims in urban areas (whether as business 
investments or on their lifestyle).  
The third implication is related to the already known finding that CAP expenditure to 
a large extent supports incomes rather than technological progress. CAP payments 
can be understood as a welfare payment, enhancing the incomes of farm households 
rather  than  following  any  other  of  the  original  CAP  targets.  This  assumption  is 
supported by a number of official publications that report that without CAP payments 
farming is a highly unprofitable business in a number of rural areas and often on small farms. Therefore in practical terms CAP payments are social welfare payments for the 
largest number of farms while in the bigger farms CAP payments are a welcome 
amendment to already existing high incomes from production and often diversified 
investments (e.g. renewable energy, sporting enterprises, etc.).  
For the future of the CAP and especially the Pillar One payments in Scotland there are 
two main messages from this analysis.  
First, from a point of view of distributional justice a more equal distribution of the 
payments  under  Pillar  One  should  be  envisaged.  The  current  cross  compliance 
regulations are already state of the legislation and therefore it is hard to justify these 
payments for the next programming period. A way forward would be to pay a lump 
sum that leans forward to the poverty pay already existing in the UK. This would be 
an opportunity to support those farms who are already depending to a 100 or even 
more per cent with their annual household income on CAP expenditure. Currently the 
poverty pay in the UK equals about £13,000 (see DWP 2009).  
Supposed  that  such  a  lump  sum  is  paid  to  each  farmer  in  Scotland  who  actually 
claims, the expenses under Pillar One would be reduced to £258 million annually. 
Such  a  system  (probably  based  on  historical  claiming  enterprises)  would  enhance 
distributional justice and therefore result in a gini-coefficient of 0 (Indicating that 
each farmer gets the same amount). Furthermore such a system would save about 
£168 million that would be secondly free for an amendment of Pillar Two measures 
(e.g. Investment into new technologies like tidal power, education, etc.).  
Such additional funds would solve the second revealed problem: Rural development 
measures are given to the areas that are likely to be in the richer South-Eastern parts 
of Scotland rather than to the poorer North-Western parts.  
This problem is that, against popular knowledge Pillar Two funds are not entirely 
spent to claimants in rural areas. With the additional funds more investment into agri-
environmental schemes (axis two) as well as into rural development measures (axis 
three) and the successful LEADER approaches would be available. Furthermore there 
could be specifically designed programs that would enhance the payments to rural 
remote areas and ensure that also the areas seem unattractive now, there would be 
more initial support for initiatives that try to develop such remote rural areas.   
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